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Policy Points: 
 A major factor explaining government actors’ failure to mitigate or avert the Flint, Michigan, 
water crisis is the sheer complexity of the laws regulating how governmental agencies 
maintain and monitor safe drinking water. Coordination across agencies is essential in dealing 
with multiple legal arrangements.  
 Public health legal authority and intervention mechanisms are not self-executing. Legal 
preparedness is essential to efficiently navigating complex legal frameworks to address public 
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 The Flint water crisis demonstrates the importance of democracy for protecting the public’s 
health. Laws responding to municipal fiscal distress must be consistent with expected norms 
of democracy and require consideration of public health in decision making.  
 
Context: The Flint, Michigan, water crisis resulted from a state-appointed emergency financial 
manager’s cost-driven decision to switch Flint’s water source to the Flint River. Ostensibly designed 
to address Flint’s long-standing financial crisis, the switch instead created a public health emergency. 
A major factor explaining why the crisis unfolded as it did is the complex array of laws regulating 
how governmental agencies maintain and monitor safe drinking water.  
 
Methods: We analyzed these legal arrangements to identify what legal authority state, local, and 
federal public health and environmental agencies could have used to avert or mitigate the crisis and 
recommend changes to relevant laws and their implementation. First, we mapped the legal authority 
and roles of federal, state, and local agencies responsible for safe drinking water and the public’s 
health—that is, the existing legal environment. Then we examined how Michigan’s emergency 
manager law altered the existing legal arrangements, leading to decisions that ignored the 
community’s long-term health. Juxtaposed on those factors, we considered how federalism and the 
relationship between state and local governments influenced public officials during the crisis. 
 
Findings: The complex legal arrangements governing public health and safe drinking water, 
combined with a lack of legal preparedness (the capacity to use law effectively) among governmental 
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manager’s virtually unfettered legal authority in Flint exacerbated the existing complexity and 
deprived residents of a democratically accountable local government.  
 
Conclusions: Our analysis reveals flaws in both the legal structure and how the laws were 
implemented that simultaneously failed to stop and substantially exacerbated the crisis. Policymakers 
need to examine the legal framework in their jurisdictions and take appropriate steps to avoid similar 
disasters. Addressing the implementation failures, including legal preparedness, should likewise be a 
priority for preventing future similar crises. 
 
Keywords: public health practice, environment and public health, law, environmental exposure. 
 
The Flint, Michigan, water crisis—a manmade tragedy that exposed thousands of children 
and adults to excessive lead levels in the city’s drinking water—was far from inevitable. The crisis 
resulted from a state-appointed emergency financial manager’s decision in April 2014 to switch 
Flint’s water source from the Detroit water system to the Flint River, ostensibly as a cost-saving 
measure to address Flint’s long-standing financial crisis. Rather than alleviating a crisis, the switch 
created a major public health emergency and caused long-term harm to Flint residents’ health, 
wellbeing, and trust in government. 
Beyond the emergency manager’s failure to take into account the public’s health, a major 
factor explaining why the crisis unfolded as it did is the sheer complexity of the laws regulating how 
governmental agencies should maintain and monitor safe drinking water. In this article, we analyze 
the multiple legal arrangements at the heart of the Flint water crisis and recommend changes to 
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appointment of an emergency manager, what legal authority could state, local, and federal public 
health and environmental agencies use to avert or mitigate the crisis? What legal changes are needed 
to prevent a similar public health crisis from occurring elsewhere?  
Understanding what happened in Flint matters not only for accountability purposes, but also 
because there is little doubt that the Flint water crisis presages similar critical challenges facing many 
American cities. Certainly, the legal failures we detail in this paper were not the sole cause of the 
crisis. But examining how the intersection and implementation of various laws shaped decisions 
addressing a municipality’s immediate financial crisis at the expense of the community’s long-term 




In its review of what went wrong, the Michigan Governor’s Task Force assigned primary 
responsibility for the state’s collective failure to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
(MDEQ; this department has since been renamed).
1
 Before permitting the switch, MDEQ did not 
require the Flint water department to treat the water with anticorrosion control measures that would 
have cost the city approximately $140 per day and would have averted the crisis.
2
 As a result, lead 
from the aging service lines to homes leached into the drinking water. Despite immediate complaints 
from residents about the water’s smell, taste, and color, plus the fact that General Motors abandoned 
the Flint water system in October 2014 due to corrosion concerns, state and local officials assured the 
public that the water was safe to drink.
3
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In September 2015, at a press conference in Flint, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha presented results 
of elevated blood lead levels (EBLLs) in Flint’s children, which the state instantly rejected.
1,4
 
Nonetheless, the state relented in October 2015 and the water was switched back to the Detroit water 
system. Subsequently, residents learned that MDEQ’s water testing was faulty, the department had 
misapplied the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), and the 
state health department prematurely dismissed evidence of EBLLs.
1 
County public health officials 
declared a public health emergency and issued a water advisory in October 2015; the Flint mayor 
declared a state of emergency in December 2015. After more than 18 months of denying a problem, 
state officials finally declared a state of emergency in Genesee County in January 2016. Even if the 
resulting harms are not as extensive as feared initially,
5
 the lead exposure will negatively affect the 
community’s health, especially its children, for years.  
The Flint community also suffered from a series of Legionnaires’ disease outbreaks that 
allegedly caused 12 deaths in 2014-2015.
6
 Although there is some dispute about the cause of the 
outbreak, researchers identified inadequate free chlorine levels in the Flint water system following the 
switch to the Flint River as the leading suspect.
7
 Publicly released emails indicate that the Genesee 
County Health Department (GCHD) became concerned about the county’s increased incidence of 
Legionnaires’ disease in October 2014 and raised these concerns with both the Michigan Department 
of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) and the Flint Department of Public Works (DPW) at that 
time.
1 
Within a few months of GCHD’s investigating the outbreak, MDEQ, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), the EPA, and the Michigan governor’s office were also made aware of 
the outbreak and the suspected link to the Flint water supply.
1
 In fact, a CDC official observed in 
April 2015 that the outbreak was unusually large—―one of the largest we know of in the past 
decade‖—and needed a comprehensive investigation.
8
 Nevertheless, MDHHS declined the CDC’s 
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6 
and the public was not notified until January 2016
9




The factual and legal underpinnings of the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak are important to 
our analysis of Flint’s drinking water (ie, lead poisoning) crisis because the legionella outbreak 
occurred simultaneously and has been linked to the same change in water source. As a result, the 
events surrounding the spread of Legionnaires’ disease are intertwined with and provide necessary 
context to government officials’ and the public’s understanding of whether Flint’s water was being 
properly treated. Although efforts to avert and mitigate the spread of Legionnaires’ disease may have 
suffered from similar problems as did efforts to avert and mitigate exposure to lead, this article 
focuses primarily on the drinking water crisis and therefore discusses Legionnaires’ disease only as 
necessary to provide context. 
   
Methods 
 
We examined the legal framework in two phases. Initially, we mapped the legal authority and 
roles of federal, state, and local agencies responsible for safe drinking water and the public’s health—
what we call the existing legal environment. Then we examined how Michigan’s emergency manager 
law altered the existing legal arrangements, leading to decisions that ignored the community’s long-
term health. Juxtaposed with those factors, the authors considered how federalism and the relationship 
between state and local governments influenced the scope and authority of public officials’ responses 
during the crisis. For each aspect, we built the matrices shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3 to indicate how 
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To conduct our analysis, we used standard legal research methods. That is, we used available 
legal databases to identify and examine the applicable statutes, ordinances, and regulations relevant to 
the Flint water crisis. Throughout, we used an iterative process to ensure accuracy and thoroughness 
of the legal analyses. For example, after Boufides conducted the initial mapping, Jacobson, Chrysler, 
and Bernstein reviewed and commented on the results. As each matrix was being developed, we used 
the same process to determine how to array and display the results.  
In any analysis of legal texts, there is an element of subjectivity. In this case, our assessment 
of gaps and overlaps did not vary among the authors but might vary across other analysts. To address 
this limitation, we subsequently shared our analysis with three  professionals who are deeply familiar 
with all of the Flint legal issues—two attorneys (a public health law practitioner and a public health 
law scholar) and a public health practitioner. They independently confirmed our research methods and 
construction of the matrices. 
For Phase I, we first identified government agencies at all levels with a significant role in 
regulating public health or safe drinking water, including responsibility for (a) environmental health 
hazards; (b) safe drinking water; (c) protecting the public’s health; and (d) conducting public health 
investigations. Next, we searched for all laws relating to each agency’s general grant of authority, 
along with its mandatory and discretionary legal functions relative to safe drinking water or public 
health.  
We then developed summary matrices (available from the authors) of public health and 
environmental laws to structure our analysis of each agency’s actual or potential relationship to the 
unfolding events. We consolidated the matrices into the legal framework templates shown in Figure 1 
and arrayed each agency’s legal authority according to the key public health functions associated with 
the crisis: (1) prevention (action to avoid exposure to lead or legionella); (2) surveillance and 
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identify a public health threat); and (4) intervention (actions to mitigate or avert a public health 
threat).  
As shown in Figure 2, we combined the separate matrices to capture powers and 
responsibilities at the intersection of the two legal frameworks. Ideally, each point of intersection in 
each matrix (eg, from state to local, from health department to environmental department, or from 
prevention functions to surveillance functions) would represent a clean transition of authority from 
one agency or level of government to another. Preferably, juxtaposing the safe drinking water and 
public health legal frameworks would clearly indicate where one agency’s responsibility ends and 
another’s begins. But in reality, these intersections depict gaps or overlap between the two legal 
frameworks that create significant implementation challenges. For that reason, we assessed potential 
overlapping jurisdiction (ie, powers shared with or monitored by multiple agencies) and gaps in 
authority that could produce failures to communicate across agencies and governmental levels. From 
this, we developed a structural legal failures matrix and an implementation needs matrix indicating 
impediments to effective legal and nonlegal responses. For Phase II, we examined the specific 
provisions of Michigan’s emergency manager law and how the law was implemented during the Flint 
water crisis. In particular, we examined how the governor’s appointment of an emergency manager 
shaped and limited the ability of other responsible agencies to exercise their legal authority. In 
addition, we explored emergency manager laws in other states to identify, compare, and contrast key 
features of these laws. We investigated alternative strategies for addressing local financial distress in 
states without emergency manager laws.  
We then mapped the emergency manager legal structure onto the Phase I Summary Matrix, as 
shown in Figure 3. This approach illuminates how the appointment of an emergency manager 
undermined the existing legal environment and contributed to what went wrong in Flint. The 
methodology enables us to evaluate whether the failures were inherent in the structural (ie, objective) 








The Existing Legal Environment for Safe Drinking Water and Public Health 
 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the multiple laws, agencies, and levels of government responsible for 
safe drinking water and protecting the public’s health. Figure 2 demonstrates that environmental and 
health agencies share overlapping responsibility for surveillance, investigation, and intervention to 
protect the public from health threats associated with contaminated drinking water. The existing legal 
environment thus resulted in numerous overlapping responsibilities, gaps, and structural and 
implementation failures. Though overlap is not inherently problematic, it is almost inevitable that 
gaps will occur if the relevant agencies have not communicated and prepared for instances of 
overlapping authority. (Figure 3 shows how the emergency manager law affected the existing legal 
environment.) 
 
Safe Drinking Water 
 
 Starting with safe drinking water (marked by the letter ―x‖), Figure 2 shows divided 
responsibility at the federal, state, and local levels. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),
10
 the 
EPA is responsible for establishing and enforcing safe drinking water standards. But the SDWA 
allows the EPA to delegate primary enforcement authority (primacy) to the states, which it has done 
in most instances (though the EPA retains the authority to override state decisions). In Michigan, 
MDEQ has primacy for assuring safe drinking water, including exclusive jurisdiction over permitting 
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In the context of Flint, the key regulation is the LCR.
11
 Because lead exposure is unsafe at any 
level, the LCR requires a specified treatment technique referred to as optimal corrosion control 
treatment (OCCT), which is designed to prevent harmful lead concentration in drinking water. Instead 
of setting health-based contaminant standards, the rule establishes a lead action level. If exceeded in 
more than 10% of tap water samples, the lead action level triggers additional system-level actions 
such as lead service-line replacement.
12 
For Flint, the permitting process should have required OCCT as a condition for switching the 
water source to the Flint River. Contravening the LCR, MDEQ allowed the switch to occur without 
adequate corrosion control treatment in place and used improper sampling techniques to test for lead. 
MDEQ failed to require adequate and needed upgrades to the aging Flint Water Treatment Plant prior 
to the switch and misled the EPA about OCCT implementation.
1
  
At the local level, the mayor and city council would ordinarily be responsible for the decision 
to switch the water source, while the local DPW would retain responsibility for operating and 
maintaining the water supply on a daily basis, including meeting OCCT standards. As we discuss later 
in the paper, the appointment of an emergency manager suspended local authority for these decisions. 
In any event, DPW lacked adequate resources to upgrade the facilities and consequently was not 
equipped to effectively treat the corrosive Flint River water after the switch. Indeed, mere days before 
the switch, the Flint laboratory and water quality supervisor emailed MDEQ officials to express 
concern about the plant’s readiness, saying,  ―If water is distributed from this plant in the next couple 
of weeks, it will be against my direction.‖
1(Appendix V, p6)
 Nevertheless, water distribution began and was 
accompanied almost immediately by complaints from Flint residents regarding the water’s foul odor, 











State and local agencies have primary responsibility for protecting the public’s health 
(marked by the letter ―y‖ in Figure 2). The Michigan Public Health Code creates a system in which 
the state and county health departments have parallel authority, with the state retaining the authority 
to take over local health functions anytime a county fails to perform its responsibilities.
13,14
 Both state 
and county health departments have broad authority to investigate and intervene when the public’s 
health is threatened, but health departments in Michigan do not play a role in preventing health threats 
associated with type I community public drinking water supplies (as shown by the bolded block in 
Figure 2). Significantly, there is no requirement for environmental agencies to provide information to 
health departments regarding specific environmental health threats or changes to water treatment 
methods.  
Even though health departments did not have a role in regulating Flint’s drinking water to 
prevent contaminants from entering the water, they still had a key role in preventing harm. They 
retained responsibility for monitoring the public’s health, identifying and investigating aberrations, 
and acting to avert or mitigate potential harm. Most important, both state and local health departments 
retained the authority under Michigan’s Public Health Code to investigate a threat to the public’s 
health, issue an imminent danger order, or seek an injunction to correct or abate a nuisance, unsanitary 
condition, or cause of illness. While doing so would have put either the state health department or the 
local health department in conflict with MDEQ, it might have facilitated an exchange of information 
that the local health department needed to protect the public’s health. Notwithstanding their 










Structural Legal Failures 
  
One of the most glaring structural flaws we observed in the public health legal framework 
relative to safe drinking water is the lack of a specific and defined role for public health agencies. 
Both federal and state drinking water laws are designed to protect the public’s health, but in 
Michigan, public health agencies are only tangentially involved in their implementation. Rather than 
having specific powers related to safe drinking water, public health legal authority arises from general 
grants of authority to monitor or intervene to protect the public’s health. Michigan law delegates 
primary legal authority and responsibility for safe drinking water to MDEQ, independent of public 
health agencies. The absence of public health expertise and prioritization in prevention activities 
contributed to the subsequent implementation failures. 
A reciprocal structural flaw is that MDEQ was not required to share information with the state 





We agree with the Governor’s Task Force that ―MDEQ caused this crisis to happen‖
1(p29)
 
when the department abdicated its essential and unique responsibilities as the state’s environmental 
health agency. For instance, MDEQ approved Flint’s water supply construction permit including only 
minimal water treatment plant upgrades despite concerns about the overall safety of using the Flint 
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treatment; MDEQ did not require the city’s DPW to correct LCR violations; and MDEQ reported 
inaccurate information to the EPA regarding corrosion control in Flint, contributing to the EPA’s 
failure to override the state’s improper OCCT determination.
1
   
We also assessed a litany of implementation failures that emerged from investigations during 
and after the crisis, particularly the lack of communication and coordination, which seem to have 
stemmed from either inadequate legal preparedness (defined broadly as an understanding of and 
capacity to quickly and effectively use law) or poor agency culture. For example, MDEQ and the Flint 
DPW refused to cooperate with GCHD’s Legionnaires’ disease investigation and MDHHS rebuffed 
the CDC’s offers to assist GCHD’s investigation.
8
 In May 2015, MDHHS concluded that the 
Legionnaires’ disease outbreak was over, even as cases continued to emerge and GCHD continued to 
investigate.
1 
Several agencies had legal authority to intervene as the water crisis progressed, but the 
jurisdictional gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies in Michigan’s existing legal framework elicited 
confused, contradictory, and ultimately deleterious policy responses. Predictably, this produced 
missed opportunities to mitigate the crisis.  
For instance, with the Public Health Code’s broad grant of legal authority, both the state 
health department (MDHHS) and the local health department (GCHD) were legally well-equipped to 
act, yet were reluctant to intervene, arguing they lacked sufficient information. Nevertheless, the 
departments surely could have been louder and more demanding in requesting information and 
cooperation. Indeed, responsibility for using its bully pulpit to sound the alarm must be understood as 
embedded within a local health department’s role as the primary provider of local public health 
services. Although Michigan’s public health legal structure limited what GCHD could formally 
undertake within the City of Flint regarding regulation of drinking water, the agency’s county-wide 
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The legal mechanisms enabling agencies to intervene when another agency’s actions or 
omissions threaten the public’s health are not self-executing. Legal checks and balances are futile if a 
co-equal agency adopts a policy of noninterference or deference without first establishing channels for 
communication and true cooperation. 
 
The Emergency Manager Law 
 
Michigan’s municipal financial emergency law, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, 
empowers the governor to place complete legal control of financially distressed Michigan 
municipalities in the hands of a state-appointed emergency financial manager. The emergency 
manager is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the governor and is shielded from tort liability 
for his or her decisions. A unique aspect of Michigan’s emergency manager law is the extent to which 
it removes all power from locally elected officials, hence completely displacing local democracy. 
Although four separate individuals served as Flint’s emergency manager between 2011 and 2015,
1
 we 
use the singular form when referring to the emergency manager law’s structure. 
As shown in Figure 3, the emergency manager’s appointment significantly alters the Phase I 
legal framework in at least two ways. First, the appointment adds two new entities—the State 
Department of Treasury and the emergency manager—to how the various laws operate and intersect 
(indicated in Figure 3 by the smaller of the two bolded blocks). More important, it removes all legal 
authority vested in Flint city officials (indicated by the large X in Figure 3). Because the emergency 
manager is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the governor, he or she operates as a state- 
rather than a municipal-level actor. The emergency manager has complete authority over 
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budgeting, and employees. As a result, the existing legal framework is inverted, with almost all power 
concentrated at the state level (shown in Figure 3 by the larger of the bolded blocks). 
[Insert figure 3 here.] 
An emergency manager is empowered to ―act for and in the place and stead of the governing 
body and the office of chief administrative officer of the local government,‖ and the law declares a 
purpose to safeguard ―the capacity of local units of government and school districts to provide or 
cause to be provided necessary services essential to the public health, safety, and welfare.‖
15 
But the 
statute does not impose specific requirements for how the emergency manager should take the 
public’s health and welfare into account in making fiscal decisions. That is, the statute does not 
require the emergency manager to balance the public health implications, such as through cost-benefit 
or cost-effectiveness analyses, relative to the municipality’s fiscal needs. Indeed, the failure to 
consider the public’s health occurred despite the emergency manager’s very purpose of preserving 
governmental services to protect the health, safety, and welfare of Flint residents.  
The Flint water crisis shows the catastrophic consequences of an emergency manager’s 
failure to understand his or her role more broadly. At least one Flint emergency manager has 
professed to understanding that his role was to focus solely on fiscal management, and not on 
protecting the community.
16
 An emergency manager’s failure to recognize the broader responsibilities 
associated with completely taking over a local government—combined with a lack of expertise for 
identifying and assessing the public health implications of policy choices—undoubtedly contributed 
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Structural Legal Failures 
 
We identified three major structural flaws in Michigan’s emergency manager law. First, the 
law lacked democratic accountability. Second, the law did not include specific operational 
requirements for the emergency manager to consider public health in decision making. Its only 
specific directions pertained to fiscal realities. Third, there is no specific requirement for the 




Serious implementation failures exacerbated the structural flaws. Government officials at 
every level ignored or disregarded community concerns and complaints. As a result, the collective 
emergency managers who served Flint either failed or refused to recognize the scope of the emerging 
environmental and public health harms and did not prevent or mitigate them. Not surprisingly, the 
ensuing fiscal harm exceeded the putative cost savings by orders of magnitude. 
Beyond disrupting the existing legal framework, the lack of democratic accountability in the 
emergency manager law poses an additional, distinct threat to health. In particular, because each 
emergency manager completely supplanted the authority of Flint’s locally elected officials, yet was 
unwilling and not legally required to consider their concerns, local citizens’ voices went unheeded for 
over a year. The effective silencing of Flint citizens enabled the development, progression, and 
perpetuation of the water crisis. Because there is always the risk that someone will act outside the 
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manager’s decisions may be just as important as having clear legal mandates, competent government 
officials, and appropriate criteria for decision making. 
The emergency manager law’s shortcomings are particularly troubling given its 
disproportionate application in communities of color. In its report on the crisis, the Michigan Civil 
Rights Commission noted that almost 50% of Michigan African Americans have lived under 
emergency management, as compared to less than 10% of all Michiganders.
17
 The Governor’s Task 
Force Report and other analyses of the crisis have similarly recognized that implicit bias and 
structural racism likely affected how the laws were implemented in Flint, arriving at the ―inescapable 






Our legal analysis reveals several crucial deficiencies. In short, we observe failures in both 
the legal structure and how the laws were implemented that failed to stop and substantially 
exacerbated the crisis. Under these circumstances and the complex legal arrangements in Flint, it 
should not be surprising that harried public officials, acting under great pressure, failed to coordinate 
across units or use their legal authority effectively to prevent the crisis or mitigate its extent.  
Regardless of the collective emergency managers’ separate actions, the existing legal 
environment created gaps, overlapping jurisdiction, and inconsistencies that alone would have been 
problematic for governmental actors. In retrospect, the Flint water crisis exposed the shortcomings in 
Michigan’s existing legal framework that contributed to confused and ultimately deleterious policy 
responses. Two key aspects stand out: first, although MDEQ had primary responsibility for safe 
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and second, while the emergency manager’s jurisdiction over Flint prevented the city’s elected 
officials from acting, it did not supplant the local health department’s county-wide authority. Thus, it 
seems clear that inadequate legal preparedness contributed significantly to how and why the crisis 
unfolded as it did. In this context, it is worth noting that governmental action and inaction during the 
water crisis has generated a multitude of both civil and criminal litigation against the State of 
Michigan and various officials involved in decision making. An examination of that litigation is 
beyond the scope of this paper, most importantly because our focus is on examining ways to improve 
public health law structures and practices to prevent future crises rather than assigning blame to 
specific individuals for the Flint crisis.  
Our analysis demonstrates how appointing an emergency manager with virtually unlimited 
legal authority exacerbated the already complex legal arrangements governing safe drinking water. 
The emergency manager law allowed an unaccountable state-appointed official to undertake crucial, 
long-term local decisions without considering the public’s health, while simultaneously upending the 
familiar intergovernmental relationships and communication channels that might otherwise have 
provided a check on those decisions, especially at the local level. Against this inauspicious backdrop, 
the law’s autocratic structure effectively silenced the affected community.  
Assessing responsibility is important for a variety of reasons. For one thing, the Flint 
community deserves monetary compensation and governmental resources to address the very real and 
severe damage they continue to endure. For another, it is essential to ensure accountability of 
government and private actors and to restore a sense of justice and fairness to a community that has 
been harmed. Equally important, a retrospective assessment can develop strategies to help prevent the 
occurrence of similar disasters in the future, especially in communities facing fiscal challenges and 
aging infrastructure. Importantly, because emergency manager laws are invoked in financially 
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Why is the legal environment so complex? Among the many reasons for the legal complexity, 
three emerge as the most significant. They represent the confluence of structural problems, 
implementation failures, and the sheer number of actors involved who were not prepared to deal with 
the complexity. 
First is the difficulty of building a structural legal framework that avoids gaps and overlaps 
when confronting problems that involve the interaction of entirely different legal regimes. In the Flint 
water crisis, relevant actors needed to understand and be able to implement both Michigan’s public 
health laws and the safe drinking water requirements. In conjunction with this complex legal 
environment, the Governor’s Task Force recommended changes to MDEQ’s agency culture and the 
regulatory compliance environment, urging the agency to ―default to public health protection‖ where 
there is legal ambiguity.
1(p29)
 In a separate letter to Governor Snyder, the Task Force also 
recommended focusing on drinking water safety rather than ―minimalist technical compliance.‖
18 
It is 
additionally important to recognize that multiple other agencies had authority to investigate and 
intervene when MDEQ failed to properly implement its responsibilities. For example, local and state 
public health agencies possessed broad, general legal authority to respond to public health threats, yet 
seemed hesitant to exercise their general authority in response to an environmental threat for which 
specific authority resided with the state’s environmental agency. It therefore seems reasonable to 
conclude that in the midst of the crisis, it was difficult for the relevant agencies to comprehend and 
synthesize the two legal regimes and act accordingly, let alone factor in how the emergency manager 
law affected decisions that would have been routine without an emergency manager. 
Another reason for the complexity is the inherent ambiguity of how laws are written, which 
exacerbates the challenges of assuring adequate legal preparedness. Though some ambiguity is 
difficult to avoid, legal uncertainty and inadequate legal preparedness contributed to the 
implementation deficiencies, especially as to how and why the crisis unfolded as it did. According to 
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use of laws; coordination of legal interventions across jurisdictions; and information resources and 
dissemination.
19 
None of these elements was met before or during the Flint water crisis. In fact, the 
crisis exposed considerable flaws in each element. Our analysis of the gaps and overlaps indicates a 
lack of cohesiveness across legal regimes that contributed to poor coordination across agencies, 
deficient communication, and inadequate data sharing. In this case, laws that regulate different 
concerns across different agencies were enacted and implemented in silos, failing to address the need 
for an integrated, coordinated framework. Our analysis demonstrates how ineffective coordination 
impeded successful implementation of the law. But even a more consistent legal regime with better 
coordination and communication might not have avoided the crisis. Nonetheless, it seems fair to 
suggest that improved legal preparedness might have at least mitigated the ensuing harm.  
A final observation is that the number of actors involved at various levels of government 
made it difficult to communicate and coordinate across agencies and levels of government. Many of 
the implementation failures we describe could have been avoided had fewer actors been involved. 
This is again where legal preparedness is important. As with disaster preparedness generally, effective 
responses depend on communication and coordination that need to be designed and tested ahead of 
time. For example, the federal government funded bioterrorism preparedness exercises that included 
all agencies likely to be first responders. Similar preparedness exercises will be needed to prevent 
another Flint water crisis. 
Although not specifically part of our study, it seems clear that agency cultures also 
contributed to the Flint water crisis. Public health tends toward a risk-averse, procedurally based 
culture,
20
 meaning that practitioners often fear acting prematurely or without adequate legal authority,
 
and public health agencies acted accordingly in Flint. The environmental agencies acted within 
similar constraints, but also suppressed critical information.
1
 Moreover, when confronted with new 
evidence that contradicted expectations or previously drawn conclusions, both environmental and 
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and correct mistakes. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that a culture of punishing transparency and 
summarily denying bad news seemed to pervade the agencies in the Flint tragedy. 
Finally, and likewise not a part of this study, many journalists, commentators, and community 
activists have reported on the likely role of structural racism, implicit bias, and overt racial animus in 
the Flint water crisis. As noted above, the governor’s own task force concluded that race was an 
important factor in how the crisis transpired.
1
 Equally direct, in his 2016 testimony before the 
Michigan Civil Rights Commission, Professor Peter Hammer discussed the role of express, structural, 
and strategic racism in multiple aspects of the Flint water crisis, including the passage and underlying 
assumptions of the emergency manager law, the series of decisions that led to switching Flint’s 
drinking water source, and the governmental inaction that enabled the crisis to continue for as long as 
it did.
21
 Though beyond the scope of this study, racism and political bias toward communities of color 
and low-income communities must be recognized as factors that likely contributed to both the 
structural and implementation failures we have discussed.  
    
Key Recommendations 
 Based on the structural flaws and implementation failures described above, we identified key 
legal and policy changes that can help to prevent or mitigate future crises. To be most effective, these 
recommendations must work in tandem with transformed agency cultures. 
Emergency manager laws. The Flint water crisis is a case study showing the importance of 
democracy for protecting the public’s health. A few commonsense changes in the process of 
appointing and overseeing an emergency manager can alleviate subsequent failures. These changes 
would assure that the emergency manager hears and responds to the community’s concerns. In short, 
more accountability is needed. Laws responding to municipal fiscal distress should include an explicit 
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the expected norms of democracy rather than displacing democracy entirely. States should therefore 
develop a rigorous process for public participation and engagement in decision making once an 
emergency manager is appointed. Further, states should develop appropriate criteria requiring the 
emergency manager to take into account the public’s health and not just focus on cost-cutting 
measures. When decisions implicate the public’s health, appropriate experts must be consulted. 
Moreover, an emergency manager should be required to consult regularly with local public health 
officials to assure identification of less obvious and/or long-term public health consequences.   
Safe drinking water. Public health agencies should be involved in regulating safe drinking 
water supplies. Structurally, this could be achieved through changes in the permitting process and in 
environmental regulations. State environmental laws should require local health department 
participation in the permitting process for public water systems within their jurisdiction. The state 
environmental agency should develop regulations requiring coordination with state and local health 
departments regarding actions to be taken and when to notify the public of an environmental health 
threat. Before granting primacy to the states, the EPA should conduct a more rigorous review of state 
programs and closely examine the culture of the state agency responsible for safe drinking water. 
Public health. In the Flint water crisis, the primary problem was with implementation, not the 
Public Health Code’s structure. Addressing the implementation failures should be a priority for 
avoiding future similar crises. This would include building capacity for legal preparedness, using legal 
authority to aggressively investigate and oppose threats to the public’s health, and developing criteria 
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Figure 1. Legal Framework Templates 
Safe Drinking Water Legal Framework 
 Federal State County City 
  EPA HHS 
/ 
CDC 
Governor MDEQ MDHHS GCHD Mayor City 
Council 
DPW 
Prevention          
Surveillance/ 
Detection 
         
Investigation          
Intervention          
 
Public Health Legal Framework 
 Federal State County City 
  EPA HHS / 
CDC 
Governor MDEQ MDHHS GCHD Mayor City 
Council 
DPW 
Prevention          
Surveillance/ 
Detection 
         
Investigation          
Intervention          
Abbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DPW, Department of Public 
Works; EPA, Environmental Protection Agency; GCHD, Genesee County Health Department; HHS, 
Health and Human Services; MDEQ, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality; MDHHS, 
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Figure 2. The Existing Legal Environment 
Public Health and Safe Drinking Water Legal Framework 
 Federal State County City 
  EPA HHS / 
CDC 
Governor MDEQ MDHHS GCHD Mayor City 
Council 
DPW 









X Y Y Y 
  
X Y 
Investigation X Y X Y X Y Y Y X X Y 
 
Intervention X Y X Y X Y Y Y X Y X Y 
 
Key:  
X  Safe Drinking Water Responsibilities 
Y  Public Health Responsibilities  
 Highlights absence of public health role in relevant prevention activities 
 
Abbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DPW, Department of Public 
Works; EPA, Environmental Protection Agency; GCHD, Genesee County Health Department; HHS, 
Health and Human Services; MDEQ, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality; MDHHS, 
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Figure 3. The Emergency Manager Law 
Public Health and Safe Drinking Water Legal Framework + Emergency Manager 
 Federal State County City 
  EPA HHS / 
CDC 
Governor Treasury EM MDEQ MDHHS GCHD Mayor City 
Council 
DPW 
Prevention X Y 
  
X Y X Y X Y 
 
 









Investigation X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y Y Y X X Y 
 
Intervention X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y Y Y X Y X Y 
 
Key:  
X  Safe Drinking Water Responsibilities 
Y  Public Health Responsibilities  
  Highlights changes to framework due to emergency manager’s appointment 
 
Abbreviations: CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DPW, Department of Public 
Works; EM, Emergency Manager; EPA, Environmental Protection Agency; GCHD, Genesee County 
Health Department; HHS, Health and Human Services; MDEQ, Michigan Department of 
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Table 1. Structural Legal Failures (Gaps and Ambiguities) 
 Federal State County City 
  EPA HHS / 
CDC 




































































      










      
 
Abbreviations: BLL, blood lead level; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DPW, 
Department of Public Works; EPA, Environmental Protection Agency; GCHD, Genesee County 
Health Department; HHS, Health and Human Services; MDEQ, Michigan Department of 









Table 2. Failures of Implementation (Jurisdictional Overlap and Failures to Perform)  
 Federal State County City 
  EPA HHS / 
CDC 
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Abbreviations: BLL, blood lead level; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; DPW, 
Department of Public Works; EPA, Environmental Protection Agency; GCHD, Genesee County 
Health Department; HHS, Health and Human Services; LD, Legionnaires’ Disease; MDEQ, Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality; MDHHS, Michigan Department of Health and Human 
Services; OCCT, optimal corrosion control treatment; PH, public health. 
Appendix: Timeline of Key Decisions  
This timeline documents decisions and events affecting our legal analysis of the Flint water crisis. 
Entries are excerpted or summarized from the Flint Water Advisory Task Force’s Summary Timeline 
of Key Events and Integrated Event Timeline.
1 (p16-21, Appendix V)
  
Date Event 
11/2011 Governor Rick Snyder appoints emergency manager (EM) to Flint.  
3/2013-
4/2013 
State treasurer approves EM request to contract with Karegnondi Water Authority 
(KWA) for water supply. Then–water supplier Detroit Water & Sewerage 
Department (DWSD) sends letter terminating Flint water service effective April 
17, 2014. 
4/25/2014 Flint switches to Flint Water Treatment Plant (WTP) as primary water supply 
source until expected completion of KWA pipeline in 2016. Switch occurs despite 
Department of Public Works’ (DPW) concern that WTP is not ready. Complaints 
begin immediately.  
8/15/2014 Flint issues boil water advisory (E. coli). Boosts chlorine disinfectant use.  
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10/17/2014 Genesee County Health Department (GCHD) concerned about legionellosis 
outbreak in Flint and possible connection to water supply.  
12/16/2014 MDEQ notifies Flint of quarterly violation of Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
Disinfection Byproducts requirements due to elevated levels of total 
trihalomethanes (TTHM). 
12/31/2014 Lead and copper monitoring shows two samples above lead action level.  
2/26-
27/2015 
EPA tells MDEQ that lead sampling protocol (preflushing) may be biasing results. 
MDEQ informs EPA that Flint is using corrosion control. 
3/5/2015 MDEQ notifies Flint of second quarterly violation of Disinfection Byproducts 
requirements.  
3/23/2015 Flint City Council votes to end Flint River service and return to DWSD. Vote is 
nonbinding. EM refuses to act on city council’s vote.  
4/24/2015 Contrary to prior statement, MDEQ informs EPA Flint is not using corrosion 
control.  
4/29/2015 State treasurer and EM sign emergency loan agreement stating Flint may not return 
to DWSD without state approval. Governor Snyder returns control of Flint 
finances to mayor and city council under supervision of Receivership Transition 
Advisory Board. 
5/29/2015 MDHHS reports 2014-2015 cases of legionellosis in Genesee County and 
concludes that the ―outbreak is over.‖ 
6/8/2015 MDHHS chastises GCHD for communicating with CDC regarding legionellosis 
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6/9/2015 MDEQ notifies Flint of third Disinfection Byproducts quarterly violation.  
7/21/2015 EPA informs MDEQ that Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) requires corrosion control 
in Flint.  
8/17/2015 MDEQ notifies Flint of lead and copper monitoring results, ―scrubbed‖ to exclude 
two high lead results; directs Flint to install corrosion control and phosphate 
treatment.  
8/31/2015 Professor Marc Edwards (Virginia Tech) reports on corrosive lead levels in Flint 
water.  
9/24/2015 In a press conference, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha (Hurley Medical Center) releases 
findings of elevated blood lead levels in Flint children.  
9/25/2015 Flint, with support of GCHD, issues lead advisory. 
9/29/2015 GCHD demands fresh analysis by MDHHS of state blood lead level data; issues 
public health advisory. 
10/1/2015 Genesee County Board of Commissioners and GCHD issue ―do not drink‖ 
advisory. GCHD declares public health emergency.  
10/2/2015 Governor Snyder announces Flint Action Plan to address water system.  
10/16/2015 Flint is reconnected to Detroit water system.  
11/10/2015 EPA announces intent to audit State of Michigan’s drinking water program. 
12/14/2015 Flint mayor Karen Weaver declares state of emergency in Flint. 
12/29/2015 Governor Snyder apologizes for Flint water crisis via a press release. 
1/4/2016 Genesee County Board of Commissioners declares state of emergency. 
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1/13/2016 Governor Snyder/MDHHS issues first public notice of 2014-2015 spike in 
legionellosis in Flint. 
1/16/2016 President Barack Obama approves declaration of emergency and request for 
federal aid. 
1/22/2016 Governor Snyder returns additional executive powers to Flint’s mayor.  
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